sshole: passwordless login in OpenSSH on Alpine
CVE-2026-123158 is a password login bypass in OpenSSH on Linux with musl without PAM, most often Alpine: accounts without a password accept any password longer than 256 characters, CVSS 8.1. The fix came on 5 November 2026: OpenSSH 10.6p2 and Alpine packages. Update openssh, restart sshd, check the logs. Official sources only.
Sources: OpenSSH 10.6p2 · Alpine bulletin · musl mailing list · oss-security · NVD · CISA KEV · discoverer: sshhole.com · GreyNoise · Ubuntu · Red Hat
Checklist
- All sshd instances on Alpine and other musl systems found, including container images
- The openssh package updated to the fixed version of its branch, sshd restarted
- Container images with sshd rebuilt and redeployed
- Where updating is not possible: PasswordAuthentication no
- Logs checked for “Accepted password for” on accounts without a password
Who is affected
OpenSSH SSH servers on Linux with the musl library where PAM is off. The most common case is Alpine, where openssh-server is built without PAM by default. It is dangerous only if all the conditions in the table are met.
| Condition | How it is in Alpine by default |
|---|---|
| OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on musl | Yes. The discoverer also names OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto and Docker images on Alpine with sshd |
| PAM is off | Yes: openssh-server is built without PAM. openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yes is not affected |
| PasswordAuthentication yes | Yes, this is the OpenSSH default |
| An account has “*” instead of a password | root since Alpine 3.16; users created only for key login; directory users (nslcd, winbind, sssd); the alpine user in tiny-cloud cloud images |
| At least one account has an ordinary password (a $5$ or $6$ hash) | Not on a clean system; it appears when someone sets a password |
- Root cannot be opened this way by default: PermitRootLogin prohibit-password protects it. The path to root goes through another account without a password that has doas.
- Alpine tiny-cloud cloud images (3.18.11–3.24.3): the alpine user has “*” instead of a password and doas without a password. According to Alpine, the image is safe on first boot and becomes vulnerable as soon as any password appears on the machine, for example when an administrator sets a password for the console.
- Not affected: Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL, Fedora and other glibc distributions; systems with PAM; Dropbear (musl mailing list); containers without sshd; systems with PasswordAuthentication no; locked accounts (“!” in shadow).
- Ubuntu: all releases are Not affected (ubuntu.com/security).
Alpine, 05.11.2026OpenSSH’s default PermitRootLogin prohibit-password protects root, so root is only reachable if PermitRootLogin yes is set. That does not help if another account that can log in is able to become root, for example through doas.editors' translation
Alpine, 05.11.2026Docker and other container users that do not run sshd in the container.editors' translation
Red HatRed Hat products are not affected by this vulnerability. This issue specifically requires OpenSSH to be compiled and executed against the musl C library (musl libc) without PAM enabled.editors' translation
What to do
The order follows the Alpine bulletin.
| Alpine branch | Fixed openssh package |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
| 3.20 | 9.7_p1-r6 |
| 3.19 | 9.6_p1-r3 |
| 3.18 | 9.3_p2-r4 |
| 3.17 | 9.1_p1-r7 |
| 3.16 | 9.0_p1-r6 |
- Find all sshd on musl: servers and virtual machines on Alpine, your own container images with openssh-server, embedded and network equipment.
- Update: apk upgrade -U -a. The fixed package is available in Alpine 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4.
- Restart sshd: rc-service sshd restart. Rebuild container images on the fixed package and redeploy them.
- Cloud machines from tiny-cloud images before 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8, 3.24.4: update openssh on every running machine or turn off password login.
Alpine, 05.11.2026Upgrading the package does not restart a running sshd, so you must do it after.editors' translation
Alpine, 05.11.20263.21 reached its end of support on 2026-11-01, but we have published fixed packages for each release all the way back to 3.16.editors' translation
If you cannot update right away
Turn off password login. OpenSSH, musl and Alpine all name the same measure. First make sure key login works, and do not close the current session until the new login is verified.
- Alpine 3.19 and newer: the file /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf with the line PasswordAuthentication no. Older releases do not read that directory; edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config itself, including lines inside Match blocks.
- Check the configuration: sshd -t, restart sshd, then sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication. It should print passwordauthentication no.
- If you need password login: according to Alpine, the openssh-server-pam variant with UsePAM yes is not affected.
musl, Rich Felker, 05.11.2026Anyone who cannot immediately upgrade should edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config to set: PasswordAuthentication no and restart sshd after ensuring you have working pubkey access.editors' translation
oss-security, 05.11.2026Setting `PasswordAuthentication no` in /etc/ssh/sshd_config mitigates the problem (at the obvious cost of not being able to do password auth).editors' translation
Checking for compromise
Signs follow the Alpine bulletin. This matters most for machines where sshd is reachable from the internet.
- Check doas usage, recently created users, new files and changes to authorized_keys.
- What attackers do after logging in, according to GreyNoise observations: they check whether doas works without a password, install their own Python, and write the address of a command server into /etc/hosts.
- The discoverer published a check script: github.com/oz9un/sshole.
- If compromised: reinstall the machine, replace the keys and secrets stored on it, and report the incident to KZ-CERT (the “Report an incident” section on cert.gov.kz).
Alpine, 05.11.2026Look in /var/log/messages for sshd lines reading Accepted password for an account that has no password (alpine, root, or any key-only user).editors' translation
Alpine, 05.11.2026If you cannot rule out a login, treat the machine as compromised.editors' translation
Positions of government bodies
As of 17 November 2026 the only official position is CISA adding the vulnerability to its exploited-vulnerabilities catalog.
- CISA added CVE-2026-123158 to the KEV catalog on 9 November; the deadline for US federal agencies was 12 November, and forensics were noted as needed.
- CISA's SSVC assessment: exploitation is active, automatable is no, technical impact is total.
- Kazakhstan: in the KZ-CERT news of the State Technical Service JSC for 6–17 November there is no notice about this vulnerability.
- No notices from CERT-EU, JPCERT/CC, NCSC or BSI were found as of 17 November.
USA · CISA KEV, 09.11.2026OpenBSD OpenSSH on Linux contains an unexpected status code or return value vulnerability that could allow for authentication bypass.editors' translation
Position of OpenSSH, musl and the discoverer
The OpenSSH and musl developers see differently whose bug this is. Quotes are verbatim.
- How it was found: the author built sshd in every variant (glibc and musl, with and without PAM, with and without shadow) and ran about 17,600 unusual login attempts. According to him, with the help of many AI agents.
- Why the bug went unnoticed for ten years, according to the author: OpenSSH is tested on OpenBSD and glibc, musl does not test sshd, and most distributions check the password through PAM, which does not call crypt() for “*”.
OpenSSH, release notes for 10.6p2We consider the root cause of this bug to be outside sshd, but it is exploitable via sshd and can be avoided there.editors' translation
musl, Rich Felker, 05.11.2026It is my position that this is not a bug in musl just an erroneous use by the caller. But the mechanism by which this happened is something we have been wanting to change for a while now, and it very likely will be changed in the upcoming release cycle.editors' translation
Özgün Kültekin, Wakefield, discovererevery build agreed on every login. except musl without pam.editors' translation
How to reduce risk next time
Editorial recommendations. This is a vulnerability in default settings and in the combination of two third-party components, not in your code: an inventory of what is running finds it, a code scanner does not.
- Inventory: where sshd runs, on which system and library, and who owns it. Separately, container images and equipment that are not rebuilt for years.
- An SBOM for images: which base system, which openssh and musl versions, so you can answer “are we affected or not” in minutes.
- Do not keep sshd in containers: use docker exec or kubectl exec for debugging and a separate service for file transfer.
- In your own images and machine templates, set PasswordAuthentication no by default, key login only.
- doas and sudo without a password only where truly needed: here exactly this turned a user login into root.
- Speed: 4 hours passed from the fix to a public exploit, and less than two days to the first attack. Have the emergency update procedure ready in advance: who decides, how to rebuild images, how to verify.
- SSH login logs in one place, with an alert for password login to accounts that should only log in by key.
Vulnerability analysis
Without PAM, sshd checks the password itself: it hashes the entered password with crypt() using the salt from the shadow file and compares it with the stored value. If an account has “*” instead of a hash, sshd takes the salt of another account; this protects against guessing user names by response time (CVE-2016-6210). In musl, crypt() returns the string “*” on error, and a password longer than 256 bytes is an error. The result is “*” = “*”, and login is allowed.
- CVSS 3.1 score is 8.1: over the network, with no account and no user action; attack complexity is high (a suitable account configuration is needed). CWE-394.
- Accounts with a real password are not opened this way; only those with “*” instead of a hash.
- At least one account with a $5$ or $6$ hash is needed: sshd takes its salt. That is why a clean system without passwords is not vulnerable.
- Fix in OpenSSH 10.6p2: sshd checks the minimum hash length instead of comparing with “*” (commit 4353fdc in openssh-portable).
- How it came about, according to the discoverer: 2012, musl returns “*” instead of NULL on a crypt() error and limits the password to 256 bytes; 2016, sshd starts taking another account's salt (CVE-2016-6210); 2022, Alpine 3.16 changes the root password from “!” to “*” so that key login works.
CVE recordsshd in OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on Linux, when musl libc is used without PAM, lacks a workaround for a password authentication bypass (related to misinterpretation of whether a string is intended to be a password hash). For some configurations of accounts, any password between 256 and 1024 characters succeeds. An example of a platform using musl libc without PAM is Alpine Linux.editors' translation
Timeline
Based on the GreyNoise timeline, NVD records and the CISA KEV catalog. Time is UTC.
| Date | What happened |
|---|---|
| 04.11, 21:18 | Fix written in OpenSSH, not yet published |
| 05.11, 09:01 | OpenSSH 10.6p2 released |
| 05.11 | Alpine publishes the bulletin and fixed packages for branches 3.16 through edge |
| 05.11, 12:19 | The discoverer publishes a write-up with the exact attack method |
| 05.11, 13:16 | First public exploit on GitHub |
| 05.11, 15:07 | musl mailing list: notice for OpenSSH users |
| 05.11, 16:17 | NVD entry: CVE-2026-123158, CVSS 8.1 |
| 07.11, 00:46 | First successful attack recorded by GreyNoise |
| 09.11 | CISA adds the vulnerability to the KEV catalog |
- According to GreyNoise as of 17.11: since 5 November, 77.3 million SSH connection attempts to their sensors, 5 of them look like exploitation attempts; post-compromise activity confirmed from 10 addresses.
Where to check the information
Primary sources are the developers and government services. Check retellings in the media and social networks against them.
- Developers: OpenSSH release notes (openssh.org), Alpine bulletins (alpinelinux.org/posts), musl mailing list (openwall.com/lists/musl).
- Vulnerability records: NVD (nvd.nist.gov) and cve.org.
- Exploitation: the CISA KEV catalog; GreyNoise observations.
- Kazakhstan: KZ-CERT of the State Technical Service JSC, cert.gov.kz.
- Status in distributions: ubuntu.com/security, access.redhat.com/security, security-tracker.debian.org.
Questions and answers
I run Ubuntu, Debian or RHEL. Does this affect me?
No. The musl library and a disabled PAM are required. Ubuntu and Red Hat officially state: not affected.
Details: Who is affected →Is my Alpine container vulnerable?
Only if sshd is running inside. According to Alpine, containers without sshd are not affected.
Details: Who is affected →Can this be used to log in as root?
Directly, only if PermitRootLogin yes is set. But through another account without a password that has doas, the attacker gets root, as in Alpine cloud images with the alpine user.
Details: Who is affected →I updated the package. Is that enough?
No. You need to restart sshd: according to Alpine, a package update does not restart the running process. Rebuild container images.
Details: What to do →What if I cannot update?
Turn off password login: PasswordAuthentication no. OpenSSH, musl and Alpine all name this measure. Check key login first.
Details: If you cannot update right away →Is the vulnerability being exploited?
Yes. On 9 November 2026 CISA added CVE-2026-123158 to the KEV catalog. GreyNoise recorded the first successful attack on 7 November.
Details: Positions of government bodies →Data as of 17 November 2026. English quotes are verbatim. Current versions are in the OpenSSH and Alpine bulletins.