Binance hack: what is known as of 2 November
On 29 October 2026 about $6.3 billion left Binance hot wallets. According to TRM Labs, this is the largest cryptocurrency theft in history. Binance links the start of the attack to a hacked laptop of a DevOps engineer and a service container. According to Binance, its investigation found no evidence of a leak of wallet private keys. This page collects Binance statements, estimates from independent labs, two versions of the cause, four transactions we verified ourselves, and what to do on your side.
Sources: Binance: announcement, update No. 2, update No. 4, X (per SecurityWeek, Hackread, The Block, Forbes, CoinDesk) · transactions: Etherscan · analytics: Elliptic, Chainalysis, TRM Labs, Cointegrity, PANews, France 24 / Reuters, drk.vc · CISA AA22-108A · EIP-7702 · Kazakhstan: Digital Business, AFSA, KZ-CERT · FSRA: Gulf News, Khaleej Times
Checklist
- Who can send a request to the service that signs or processes a payment, and does the service verify the caller
- Which types of operations the signing service may sign, and whether there is a closed list
- Whether there are limits on amount and frequency, including in total across all wallets or accounts
- Whether a work laptop can reach a production container directly
- Whether repositories and work machines contain files with credentials: kubeconfig, cloud and CI tokens
- Whether there is a tested procedure for quickly revoking credentials and permissions
What Binance stated
As of 2 November, Binance had published only preliminary findings. On 31 October it promised new technical details in about 48 hours, but as of 2 November there are none. A full report will come after the investigation; no date was given.
- Binance co-CEO Richard Teng, as retold by The Block, called the attack more complex than the compromise of one employee's permissions.
- Withdrawals were suspended while deposits worked: Binance clarified this in its announcement of 30.10.
- On 1 November Binance began to resume withdrawals in stages, with 15 networks in the first stage (Binance, update No. 4).
- According to Binance, about 95% of the affected amount has been covered from its own funds; on 30 October it was 80%, on 31 October 90% (Binance, updates No. 2–4). This figure has not been independently verified.
Binance, announcement of 30.10.2026 ↗Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions.
Binance, announcement of 30.10.2026 ↗We have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak.
Binance, announcement of 30.10.2026 ↗We will share a detailed technical post-mortem once the investigation is complete and the facts are fully verified.
Binance on X, investigation update ↗Our initial investigation suggested that the security incident may have involved a compromised laptop, however our subsequent investigation has uncovered additional points of breach. This was a complex attack
Binance, announcement of 30.10.2026 ↗Binance will cover all losses from the SAFU fund and the company’s funds. User funds are safe.
What we verified on the blockchain
The editors verified four key transactions on the Ethereum network themselves on 1 November: the data is taken from the blockchain, and the authorization signatures are recovered from the transactions themselves. Address names are taken from public Etherscan labels. Time is in UTC.
| Time | What the blockchain shows |
|---|---|
| 29.10, 20:20:59 | One transaction carries 50 EIP-7702 authorizations. All 50 are signed with the key of the Binance 14 address, with numbers 18,914,775 through 18,914,824, and all point to the same contract 0x63e8…6fae. Only the one whose number matches the current one takes effect |
| 29.10, 20:24:23 | A call from the Binance 14 address transfers 63 different tokens to the address 0x5227…2f8c |
| 29.10, 20:41:23 | A call from the Binance 14 address transfers 780,000,000 USDC from another Binance wallet (the smart contract “Binance: Hot Wallet 34”) to the same address 0x5227…2f8c |
| 30.10, 00:10:35 | The Binance 14 address itself sends an authorization to the zero address, and the delegation is removed |
- The signatures are valid: the network executed what the Binance 14 wallet key signed.
- The delegation was active for 3 hours 49 minutes, from 20:20:59 to 00:10:35. It was removed by the Binance 14 address itself.
- Who obtained these signatures and how, the blockchain does not show.
Independent labs
The blockchain is tracked by Elliptic, Chainalysis and TRM Labs. These are their estimates, not Binance data. The sums differ: Binance says $6.3 billion, TRM $6.36 billion, Chainalysis about $6.4 billion, Elliptic $6.43 billion (at exchange rates of different moments).
| Network | Taken out, per TRM Labs estimate |
|---|---|
| Ethereum | ≈ $3.79 billion |
| Bitcoin | ≈ $1.47 billion (18,270 BTC) |
| Tron | ≈ $628 million |
| XRP Ledger | ≈ $296 million |
| Solana | ≈ $96 million |
| Arbitrum, Optimism, Base | ≈ $39 million |
| Avalanche and Polygon | ≈ $38 million |
| Total | ≈ $6.36 billion (Binance says $6.3 billion) |
- According to TRM, about $2.7 billion has been frozen by stablecoin issuers and other parties: Tether, Circle, Ripple and others. Binance says about $3 billion. Bitcoin cannot be frozen.
- According to the drk.vc analysis, the Hot Wallet 34 wallet considered the Binance 14 address its operator, and therefore executed a transfer that came from that address.
Elliptic ↗This suggests the attacker was able to instruct Binance's signing infrastructure directly.
Elliptic, comparing with the 2025 Bybit hack ↗In both cases, it was the infrastructure and people around the wallets that were compromised, not the cryptography.
Elliptic ↗In fact, this incident is almost certainly the single largest known theft of any kind.
Chainalysis ↗submit valid signed authorizations that allowed a Binance hot wallet to run attacker-deployed code
TRM Labs ↗In TRM's assessment, this points to a compromise of Binance's hot wallet signing infrastructure.
TRM Labs ↗In this incident, a single actor obtained valid signatures for wallets on ten chains within hours.
TRM Labs ↗A request for many authorizations across a range of transaction counts should be treated as an indicator of compromise.
Two versions of the cause
How the attacker obtained the signatures is not yet proven. Experts disagree.
| Version | Who holds it | What it is based on |
|---|---|---|
| The attacker gained access to the system that signs transactions; the keys themselves did not leak | Binance, TRM Labs, Elliptic, Chainalysis, Cointegrity | Binance statement; signatures for wallets on ten networks within a few hours; 50 authorizations over a range of numbers instead of one; the delegation was revoked by the Binance wallet itself |
| Private keys leaked | SlowMist chief security officer (per PANews); Mark Karpeles, former head of Mt. Gox (France 24 citing Reuters: probably the keys of “at least two wallets”) | The blockchain shows what was signed but not who asked for the signature. Both versions are consistent with it |
- The Binance technical report will give the answer. Until then both versions remain versions.
SlowMist chief security officer, 30.10.2026 (per PANews) ↗I personally lean more toward the private key leak hypothesis.
What was said in Kazakhstan
In Kazakhstan Binance operates through Binance Kazakhstan, a separate company licensed by AFSA (AIFC). As of 2 November there are no reports of the incident on the AFSA and KZ-CERT (State Technical Service JSC) websites; we found no statements from ARDFM or the National Bank.
- This repeats the general Binance statement. The company did not separately say whether the Kazakhstan platform and its clients were affected.
- The ADGM (UAE) financial regulator FSRA said on 30.10 that it is aware of the incident, in contact with Binance and monitoring the situation (as retold by Gulf News and Khaleej Times).
Binance Kazakhstan, comment to Digital Business, 30.10.2026 ↗We have found no evidence of a leak of wallets' private keys. User funds are safe. After the work to remediate the incident is complete, we will also publish an updated proof-of-reserves report.editors' translation
What is unknown
As of 2 November there are no public answers to these questions. We will update the review when Binance publishes the report.
- How the engineer's laptop was infected.
- Which other points of compromise Binance found.
- How the signatures were obtained from the service container and how Binance's signing system is built.
- Why the signing system signed EIP-7702 authorizations.
- Whether the Binance Kazakhstan platform (a separate company licensed by AFSA, AIFC) was affected. It was not publicly reported.
How exchanges were attacked through employees before
How the laptop was infected this time is unknown. Below is how US government agencies described similar attacks on crypto companies in 2022: the targets were specifically administrators and DevOps.
CISA, FBI and US Treasury, AA22-108A, 18.04.2022 ↗Intrusions begin with a large number of spearphishing messages sent to employees of cryptocurrency companies—often working in system administration or software development/IT operations (DevOps)—on a variety of communication platforms.
CISA, FBI and US Treasury, AA22-108A, 18.04.2022 ↗The messages often mimic a recruitment effort and offer high-paying jobs to entice the recipients to download malware-laced cryptocurrency applications, which the U.S. government refers to as "TraderTraitor."
What EIP-7702 is
An Ethereum change that allows an ordinary wallet to sign a permission: after it, the wallet address executes the code of a chosen contract. The permission is valid until the owner signs a revocation. Standard status: Final.
EIP-7702 ↗The code specified by an authorization has unrestricted access to the account.
EIP-7702, security section ↗A poorly implemented delegate can allow a malicious actor to take near complete control over a signer's EOA.
What this case teaches
Each lesson is tied to a fact from this review. It applies not only to crypto exchanges: any internal service that processes payments is built similarly.
| What happened | Lesson |
|---|---|
| Entry, according to Binance, was through a DevOps engineer's laptop. In 2022 CISA described attacks on DevOps through fake job offers and infected applications | Administrator and DevOps workstations are becoming the main target. Use a separate protected machine for access to the production environment, and be careful with “test assignments” and applications sent to you |
| From the laptop it was possible to reach a service container that could send withdrawals | No direct path from a work laptop into the production environment: only through an access gateway with session recording, short sessions, time-limited and approved access |
| The signing system signed what came from inside, including 50 EIP-7702 authorizations | A service that signs or processes a payment verifies the caller and does not trust it just because it is “inside”. A closed list of allowed operation types; everything else is rejected by default |
| According to TRM, one attacker obtained signatures for wallets on ten networks within a few hours | Separate signing environments by network and wallet tier; limits on amount and frequency, both per wallet and in total; large operations need a second independent confirmation |
| Hot Wallet 34 executed the transfer because it trusted the Binance 14 address as an operator | “Operator” rights pass to everything that acts on its behalf. Review trust between systems at every platform change |
| The delegation was active for 3 hours 49 minutes, and several drains happened in that time | Alert on the unusual: code on an address where there should be none, a spike in transfers. A rehearsed procedure for quickly revoking credentials and permissions |
| Access to the production container came from a work machine | Do not keep credential files (kubeconfig, cloud and CI tokens) in repositories and on work machines longer than needed; find them by scanning and revoke them |
TRM Labs ↗A request for many authorizations across a range of transaction counts should be treated as an indicator of compromise.
What to do on your side
Steps for any company with an internal service that processes payments or signs operations. Start with the first line.
| When | What to do |
|---|---|
| Within a week | List the people and machines from which production systems that process payments or sign operations can be reached |
| Within a week | Scan repositories, CI and work machines for secrets: kubeconfig, cloud and CI tokens, keys. Revoke what you find and issue new ones |
| Within a week | Check whether there is a procedure for emergency revocation of credentials and permissions, and run it once in a drill |
| Within a month | Access to production only through a gateway with session recording, time-limited and approved; close direct paths from laptops |
| Within a month | Signing or payment service: caller verification, a closed list of allowed operations, everything else rejected |
| Within a month | Limits on amount and frequency per account and in total; a second independent confirmation for large operations |
| Within a month | Alerts on the unusual: a spike in transfers, a new operation type, a new recipient |
| Within a quarter | Separate protected machines for administrators and DevOps; training mailing on “job offers with a test assignment” |
| Within a quarter | Review trust between systems: who is an “operator” for whom and what they may do on someone else's behalf |
Timeline
Time is in UTC. It is noted what was verified on the blockchain; the rest is given per the source in parentheses.
| Time | What happened |
|---|---|
| 28.10 | Preparation: small withdrawals from Tornado Cash top up the operator wallet (TRM) |
| 29.10, 20:05 | First transfers on the XRP Ledger network (TRM) |
| 29.10, 20:20 | Transfer of 18,270 BTC (TRM) |
| 29.10, 20:20:59 | Transaction with 50 EIP-7702 authorizations (verified on the blockchain) |
| 29.10, 20:24:23 | First drain from the Binance 14 address (verified on the blockchain) |
| 29.10, 20:41:23 | 780 million USDC from Hot Wallet 34 (verified on the blockchain) |
| 29.10, 23:05 | Second wave: Avalanche and Polygon (TRM) |
| 30.10, 00:10:35 | Binance removes the delegation (verified on the blockchain) |
| 30.10 | Binance preliminary findings: DevOps engineer's laptop, service container; withdrawals suspended, deposits working (Binance) |
| 1.11 | Binance begins to resume withdrawals in stages; by its statement, about 95% is covered (Binance) |
Where to check the information
Primary sources are with Binance, on the blockchain and with government services. Check retellings in the media and social networks against them.
- Binance: the @binance account on X and the announcements section on binance.com. The full report will appear there.
- Transactions: etherscan.io, via the links in the section “What we verified on the blockchain”.
- Blockchain analytics: TRM Labs, Chainalysis, Elliptic, noting that these are company estimates.
- Kazakhstan: AFSA (afsa.aifc.kz), the regulator of AIFC platforms.
- How the editors verified the transactions: the data was taken directly from the Ethereum network, and the authorization signatures were recovered with a standard function of the ethers library. Anyone can repeat the check using the Etherscan links.
Questions and answers
Were Binance's private keys stolen?
Neither is proven. Binance states that its investigation found no evidence of a leak; TRM, Elliptic and Chainalysis speak of the signing system; the SlowMist chief security officer leans toward a key leak.
Details: Two versions of the cause →How was the engineer's laptop infected?
Unknown; Binance has not disclosed it. In 2022 CISA described attacks on employees of crypto companies, DevOps, through fake job offers and infected applications.
Details: What is unknown →Were Binance clients affected?
Binance said it will cover all losses and on 1 November began to resume withdrawals in stages. According to its data, about 95% is covered.
Details: What Binance stated →Does this affect Binance Kazakhstan?
Binance Kazakhstan repeated the general Binance statement: user funds are safe. Nothing separate was reported about the Kazakhstan platform; as of 2 November there are no statements from AFSA or KZ-CERT.
Details: What was said in Kazakhstan →What is EIP-7702 and is it to blame?
It is an Ethereum change that lets a wallet execute contract code. The network executed valid signatures of the Binance wallet; according to TRM, Binance's signing system was compromised.
Details: What EIP-7702 is →We do not work with cryptocurrency. What should we check?
The same question applies to any service that processes payments: who can send it a request and what it may execute. The steps by time frame are in the section “What to do on your side”.
Details: What to do on your side →This review was prepared by the TRAIO editors from open sources: statements by Binance and Binance Kazakhstan, publications by TRM Labs, Elliptic, Chainalysis and other companies, media reports and Ethereum blockchain data. Every quote and the end of each section has a source link. Estimates, versions and figures belong to their authors; the editors themselves verified only the four transactions from the section “What we verified on the blockchain”. Data as of 2 November 2026. The investigation is not finished, and the review will be updated after the Binance report. English quotes are given in the editors' translation, with the original under each quote. This material is not investment advice.