Hack of French Blood Establishment refrigerators: what is known as of 5 November
On the night of 2 November 2026, at three sites of the French Blood Establishment (EFS) the settings of plasma refrigerated units were changed remotely: the temperature and defrost thresholds were set to very high values. The alarm triggered, the plasma was moved, and according to EFS there were no losses. EFS itself was not the target; the attack hit the system of its refrigeration contractor. Three weeks earlier, refrigeration had been switched off in the same way in hundreds of supermarkets in France. This page collects statements from EFS, the ministry and the contractor, CERT-FR recommendations, discrepancies between sources and what to check on your side.
Sources: EFS (per franceinfo, ICI / AFP, France 2) · Solutions Numériques, Selectra, Generation-NT · France 24, NBC / AP · CERT-FR CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 · supermarkets: franceinfo 12.10, franceinfo 13.10, BleepingComputer, CNBC
Checklist
- Which equipment control devices are reachable from the internet
- Which contractors connect to the equipment remotely and how
- Whether default or predictable passwords remain
- Whether there are devices that no longer receive security updates
- Whether the equipment will accept a setpoint outside the safe range
- Whether an alarm will trigger if the controller itself is hacked
What EFS stated
EFS (Établissement français du sang) is the French national blood service: it collects donated blood and supplies hospitals. On 3 November EFS issued a statement about the incident. It does not name the contractor.
- Remote access to the affected installations has been disabled, products were moved to other units in advance, and temperature control has been tightened across the EFS network (according to an EFS statement as retold by franceinfo and AFP).
- The units held plasma for transfusion and for making medicines (franceinfo, Solutions Numériques).
- According to EFS, the service itself was not chosen as a target: the attack hit a contractor's solution installed at its sites (Solutions Numériques).
- EFS is working with ANSSI, the French national cybersecurity agency, and the Ministry of Health. Blood collection and deliveries to hospitals continue as usual.
EFS, statement of 3.11.2026 ↗les installations de supervision et de pilotage de chambres froides déployées sur trois sites de l'EFS ont été touchées
EFS, statement of 3.11.2026 ↗des seuils de température et de dégivrage ont été portés à de très hautes températures
EFS, statement of 3.11.2026 ↗Aucun impact sanitaire n'a été identifié et aucune perte de produits sanguins n'est à déclarer
EFS, statement of 3.11.2026 ↗La sécurité des stocks a pu être préservée grâce aux dispositifs de surveillance et d'alarme des installations
Frédéric Pacoud, president of EFS, France 2 ↗Comme on a repéré ça rapidement, on a pu immédiatement prendre les mesures nécessaires
What the Ministry of Health stated
The office of Health Minister Stéphanie Rist repeated the EFS conclusion: there are no health consequences. The investigation is not finished.
- The ministry is also finding out how many installations in total may have been affected and when the sites will return to operation (ICI / AFP).
- The office promised a new statement once the data is compiled (franceinfo).
Office of the Minister of Health ↗des investigations techniques se poursuivent afin de préciser : le mode opératoire et les circonstances de l'incident
The contractor
The contractor's name was given by the newspaper Le Canard enchaîné, not by EFS: the company Coolworld, which rents out and services EFS refrigerated containers. The next day Coolworld issued a statement; EFS is not mentioned in it.
- According to Coolworld, a “limited number of installations” were affected, and the company “reacted quickly” (franceinfo).
- Coolworld did not disclose whose component it is or what the vulnerability in it is.
- Who makes the equipment at the EFS sites is unknown. Whether it matches the models from the October supermarket attack was not reported (Selectra).
Coolworld, statement of 4.11.2026 ↗un composant fourni par un prestataire tiers et non contrôlé directement par Coolworld
Where the sources disagree
Some of the figures came not from EFS but from the newspaper Le Canard enchaîné and from employees' words. Below is who says what.
| Question | What the sources say |
|---|---|
| Temperature | EFS: “very high temperatures”, no figures. Le Canard enchaîné: units normally at −30 °C were reprogrammed to +110 °C. Christophe Barisien, EFS director for collection and production (AFP): “the temperature rose to 110 and even 150 degrees”, samples were not harmed. Selectra: 110 °C is a setpoint, not the temperature reached |
| What was stored | Barisien (AFP) first spoke of freezers with samples. Later EFS confirmed that frozen plasma for transfusion and for making medicines was there (Solutions Numériques) |
| Where | Three sites. One of them is Besançon, in the Bourgogne-Franche-Comté region (AFP). The other two are not named |
| When | EFS: on Monday, 2 November. Le Canard enchaîné: on the night of 1 to 2 November |
| Link to the supermarkets | Generation-NT: no formal link between the attacks has been established yet. For the November wave in supermarkets, the supplier Sabcobel speaks of the same vulnerability as in October in France (BleepingComputer). There is no such statement about EFS |
Christophe Barisien, EFS (AFP) ↗Les températures sont montées à 110 voire 150 degrés. Mais il n'y a pas eu d'altération des échantillons.
Before this: supermarkets in France and Europe
Three weeks before EFS, similar attacks switched off refrigeration in hundreds of supermarkets in France. On the same night as EFS, stores in six more European countries were attacked.
| When | What happened |
|---|---|
| Night of 11 to 12 October | France: according to franceinfo, at least 300 Intermarché and Netto stores, about 100 Coopérative U, 80 Carrefour, about 30 Monoprix, several E.Leclerc. Refrigerators and freezers were put into defrost and the temperature was raised; the director of Les Mousquetaires gives 50 °C |
| 12–16 October | CERT-FR issued alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 about hacks of remote refrigeration controllers: Danfoss AK-SC and AK-SM, Dixell XWEB, Copeland XWEB |
| 13 October | The Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation (franceinfo) |
| 2 November | More than 115 stores in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, Ireland and Estonia (BleepingComputer); CNBC adds Finland. At Swedish ICA the setpoint was changed to +50 °C |
- According to Danfoss, outdated devices no longer receive security updates (franceinfo).
- Ethical hacker Clément Domingo (SaxX) told franceinfo that a very simple password was enough to get into the devices: the current date. This is his assessment and is not officially confirmed.
- The director of Sabcobel, a refrigeration systems supplier in Belgium, told BleepingComputer that the same vulnerability was used in November as in France in October, and that a software update alone is not enough: changes to the equipment itself are needed too.
- The European Commission convened a working group with ENISA and Europol (CNBC).
- Nobody has claimed responsibility for any of the attacks.
Danfoss, comment to franceinfo ↗La majorité des appareils concernés sont des produits obsolètes
franceinfo on ANSSI, 12.10.2026 ↗a déjà identifié une vulnérabilité dans un logiciel fourni par une société danoise et a pris contact avec l'éditeur
What CERT-FR recommends
Alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 was issued on 12 October, equipment was added to it on the 13th, and the recommendations were updated on the 16th. It has no CVE numbers. The alert says nothing about EFS. Below is a retelling of the recommendations.
| Situation | What to do under the alert |
|---|---|
| The device is not hacked | Remove its access from the internet, and that of any device on a public IP. Check the whole configuration, especially the defrost schedule. Restore access only through a secure VPN or a closed network. Apply the manufacturer's recommendations, including updating the firmware |
| The device is hacked | Remove access from the internet. Reboot the Danfoss device or reset it to factory settings. Restore access only through a VPN or a closed network. Reconfigure the device before returning it to service |
| Urgent, temporary | Allow through the firewall only the addresses of the refrigeration contractor. CERT-FR writes that this is not a permanent solution |
| Before disconnecting | Check the insurance and contract terms before cutting the communication channel with the refrigeration contractor |
- For Danfoss the alert refers to the manufacturer's recommendations: update the firmware, enable the strict security level, change default passwords. For Dixell XWEB the manufacturer issued a separate secure configuration guide.
- CERT-FR warns: the attack campaigns are probably continuing. An outdated device without updates that is open to the internet will very likely be hacked. A factory reset alone is not enough: the device remains vulnerable and will be hacked again.
What is unknown
As of 5 November there are no public answers to these questions. We will update the review when EFS, the ministry or ANSSI report details.
- Who attacked and why. Nothing was stolen or encrypted (Solutions Numériques).
- What equipment is at the EFS sites and which third-party component Coolworld means.
- How the attacker got into the system: through the internet, through remote servicing or otherwise.
- Whether the attack on EFS is linked to the wave of supermarket attacks.
- Whether other Coolworld clients were affected.
What this means for developers
A refrigeration controller is a web application with firmware. Every cause in this review also occurs in ordinary products: in admin panels, APIs, internal services.
| In this incident | The same in an application | Where it is caught |
|---|---|---|
| The controller's management interface is open to the internet (CERT-FR) | An admin panel, monitoring dashboard or service API is reachable from outside | Inventory of external addresses and services, DAST on the external perimeter |
| Devices are outdated and receive no updates (Danfoss) | Libraries and images without support that can no longer be updated | SCA: dependency versions, known CVEs, end of support |
| Coolworld refers to another supplier's component | The vulnerability came from someone else's component inside the product, not from your code | SBOM: a list of the components the product is built from, at your side and your supplier's |
| Login with a default password or the date (CERT-FR; SaxX) | Default accounts, passwords and keys in code and configuration | Secret detection in repositories; configuration check before release |
| A −30 °C freezer accepted a +110 °C setpoint | The server executes a command without checking the allowed values | SAST and code review: input validation on the server, not only in the interface |
- If you supply equipment or software with remote control, the customer is left with what you shipped: a default password, an open interface, firmware without updates. Safe defaults and a support period are part of the product.
What this case teaches
Each lesson is tied to a fact from the review. This applies not only to refrigerators: any devices with remote control are built the same way, for example ventilation, UPS, server room climate, cameras, ATMs, scales.
| What happened | Lesson |
|---|---|
| CERT-FR: the management interfaces of refrigeration controllers were reachable from the internet | A device's management interface must not be open to the internet. Only through a VPN or a closed network. Regularly check your external addresses for what is open on them |
| Danfoss: most of the affected devices are outdated and receive no updates | Keep a list of devices with model, firmware and support period. Isolate or replace a device without support rather than leaving it on the network “while it works” |
| Domingo (SaxX): the password was the current date. CERT-FR: change default passwords | Check default and predictable passwords when accepting any device, like any other setting |
| The attack on EFS came through a contractor; Coolworld refers to a component of yet another contractor | Know who has remote access to your equipment, through what and from which addresses. Write the access requirements and the incident notification deadline into the contract |
| A plasma freezer at −30 °C accepted a +110 °C setpoint | The allowed range of a command must be checked by the device or server itself, not only by the control screen. For developers this is the same rule as validating input on the server |
| The alarm systems saved the stocks; the products were moved in time | The alarm must work independently of what is being controlled: a separate sensor and a separate notification channel. Decide in advance where to move the stocks and within how many minutes |
| Three weeks after France, the same vulnerability worked in six countries | After a public incident in the industry, check your own equipment the same day, without waiting for an attack |
What to do on your side
Steps for any organization with refrigeration or other remotely controlled equipment: medicine warehouses, blood centers, laboratories, stores, server rooms. Start with the first line.
| When | What to do |
|---|---|
| Within a week | Find all equipment control devices reachable from the internet at your external addresses. Close access, leave only VPN |
| Within a week | Change default and predictable passwords; check the setpoints and the defrost schedule on all controllers |
| Within a week | List the contractors with remote access: who, through what, from which addresses. Check the contract and insurance before cutting the channel |
| Within a month | A list of models and firmware with support periods; isolate devices without updates or plan their replacement |
| Within a month | Independent temperature sensors with alerts that do not depend on the controller |
| Within a month | In contractor agreements: remote access requirements, a connection log, an incident notification deadline |
| Within a quarter | Drills: “at night a unit goes above zero”. Who gets the alarm, where to move the stocks, within how many minutes |
| Within a quarter | In your own control systems, check the allowed ranges of commands on the server, not only in the interface |
Timeline
The source is given in parentheses.
| Date | What happened |
|---|---|
| Night of 11 to 12.10 | Attack on refrigeration in hundreds of supermarkets in France (franceinfo) |
| 12.10 | CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012; the prime minister assigns the case to ANSSI (CERT-FR, franceinfo) |
| 13.10 | Dixell and Copeland XWEB equipment added to the alert; the Paris prosecutor's office opens an investigation (CERT-FR, franceinfo) |
| 16.10 | CERT-FR updates its recommendations (CERT-FR) |
| Night of 1 to 2.11 | Setpoints of refrigerated units changed at three EFS sites; alarm, products moved (EFS, Le Canard enchaîné) |
| 2.11 | Attacks on refrigeration in supermarkets in six European countries (BleepingComputer, CNBC) |
| 3.11 | EFS statement (franceinfo) |
| 4.11 | Publications by Le Canard enchaîné and the media; Coolworld statement (franceinfo) |
Where to check the information
Primary sources are EFS, the French Ministry of Health and CERT-FR. Check media retellings against them.
- EFS: the press section at efs.sante.fr.
- CERT-FR: alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 at cert.cyber.gouv.fr, where updates will also appear.
- Manufacturer recommendations: Danfoss for AK-SM and AK-SC controllers, Dixell for XWEB.
- The 110 °C figure and the contractor's name come from Le Canard enchaîné; EFS itself does not confirm them.
Questions and answers
Did the blood spoil?
According to EFS, there is no loss of blood products: the alarm triggered and the plasma was moved to other units in advance. The Ministry of Health repeats this conclusion.
Details: What EFS stated →Did the units really heat up to 110 °C?
It is not known exactly. EFS writes only about “very high temperatures”. 110 °C is named by Le Canard enchaîné; the EFS director in a conversation with AFP spoke of 110 and even 150 degrees; Selectra writes that this is a setpoint, not the temperature reached.
Details: Where the sources disagree →Who attacked?
Unknown. Nobody claimed responsibility, and nothing was stolen or encrypted. ANSSI and the Ministry of Health are investigating.
Details: What is unknown →Is this the same attack as on the supermarkets?
A formal link has not been established. For supermarkets CERT-FR names Danfoss, Dixell and Copeland controllers; what equipment EFS has is unknown.
Details: Before this: supermarkets in France and Europe →Was AI used in the attacks?
There is no evidence. Rafe Pilling of Sophos told CNBC: “Even if AI is not being used in these waves of attacks on refrigeration systems today, it is worth remembering that in the future AI will likely play a significant role in organizing and carrying out such attacks.”
Details: Before this: supermarkets in France and Europe →We have no refrigerators. What should we check?
The same applies to any remotely controlled equipment: ventilation, UPS, server room climate, cameras. The steps by time frame are in the section “What to do on your side”.
Details: What to do on your side →This review was prepared by the TRAIO editors from open sources: the EFS statement as retold and quoted by franceinfo, AFP and other media, the Coolworld statement, the CERT-FR alert and media publications. Every quote and the end of each section has a source link. Figures and versions belong to their authors; 110 °C and the contractor's name were reported by the newspaper Le Canard enchaîné, and EFS does not confirm them. Data as of 5 November 2026. The investigation is not finished, and the review will be updated. French and English quotes are given in the editors' translation, with the original under each quote.